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A novel scheme for secure direct communication between Alice and Bob is proposed, where there
is no need for establishing a shared secret key. The communication is based on Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen pairs and teleportation between Alice and Bob. After insuring the security of the quantum
channel (EPR pairs), Bob encodes the secret message directly on a sequence of particle states and
transmits them to Alice by teleportation. In this scheme teleportation transmits Bob’s message
without revealing any information to a potential eavesdropper. Alice can read out the encoded
messages directly by the measurement on her qubits. Because there is not a transmission of the
qubit which carry the secret message between Alice and Bob, it is completely secure for direct secret
communication if perfect quantum channel is used.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.79.Sz
Since languages become the tool for communication,
the desire and need to transmit secret messages from one
person to another begin. Then human have the cryp-
tography - an art to transmit information so that it is
unintelligible and therefore useless to those who are not
meant to have access to it. It is generally believed that
cryptography schemes are only completely secure when
the two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, establish
a shared secret key before the transmission of a message.
This means they first have to create a random bit se-
quence, which is not known to anyone else, and which is
of the same length as the message. In order to commu-
nicate, Alice then multiplies the bits of the message one
by one with the key bits. When she announces the result
to Bob, or even publicly, then he is the only one who can
interpret it and deduce Alice’s message.
But it is difficult to distribute securely the secret key
through a classical channel. Quantum key distribution
(QKD), the approach using quantum mechanics principle
for distribution of secret key is the only proven protocol
for secure key distribution.
Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the standard
BB84 QKD protocol [1] in 1984, it has been devel-
oped quickly. Up to now there have already been a
lot of theoretical QKD schemes, for instance in Refs.
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
Different from key distribution whose object is to es-
tablish a common random key between two parties, a
secure direct communication is to communicate impor-
tant messages directly without first establishing a ran-
dom key to encrypt them. As classical message can be
copied fully, it is impossible to transmit secret messages
directly through classical channels. Recently Beige et
al. [19] proposed a quantum secure direct communica-
tion (QSDC) scheme. In this scheme the message can
be read out only after a transmission of an additional
classical information for each qubit. Bostro¨m and Fel-
binger put forward a Ping-Pong QSDC scheme [20]. It
is secure for key distribution, quasi-secure for direct se-
cret communication if perfect quantum channel is used.
But it is insecure if it is operated in a noisy quantum
channel, as shown by Wo´jcik [21]. There is some proba-
bility that a part of the messages might be leaked to the
eavesdropper, Eve, especially in a noisy quantum chan-
nel, because Eve can use the intercept-resending strategy
to steal some secret messages even though Alice and Bob
will find out her in the end of communication, especially
in a noise quantum channel. More recently Deng et al
[22] proposed a two-step quantum direct communication
protocol using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair block. It
was shown that it is provably secure. However in all
these secure direct communication schemes it is neces-
sary to send the qubits carrying secret messages in the
public channel. Therefore, Eve can attack the qubits in
transmission.
In this paper we present a scheme for direct and con-
fidential communication between Alice and Bob, where
there is no need for establishing a shared secret key.
The secure direct communication is based on Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen pairs and teleportation [23]. Because
there is not a transmission of the qubit which carry the
secret message between Alice and Bob in the public chan-
nel, it is completely secure for direct secret communica-
tion if perfect quantum channel is used.
The new protocol can be divided into two steps, one is
to prepare EPR pairs (quantum channel), the other is to
transmit messages using teleportation.
Preparing EPR pairs. — Suppose that Alice and Bob
share a set of entangled pairs of qubits in one of the Bell’s
2states
|Φ+〉AB = 1√
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉AB)
=
1√
2
(|+〉A|+〉B + |−〉A|−〉B),
|Φ−〉AB = 1√
2
(|00〉AB − |11〉AB)
=
1√
2
(|+〉A|−〉B + |−〉A|+〉B),
|Ψ+〉AB = 1√
2
(|01〉AB + |10〉AB)
=
1√
2
(|+〉A|+〉B − |−〉A|−〉B),
|Ψ−〉AB = 1√
2
(|01〉AB − |10〉AB)
=
1√
2
(|−〉A|+〉B − |+〉A|−〉B),
where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
Obtaining these states could have come about in many
different ways; for example, Alice could prepare the pairs
and then send half of each to Bob, or vice versa. Alter-
natively, a third party could prepare the pairs and send
halves to Alice and Bob. Or they could have met a long
time ago and shared them, storing them until the present.
Alice and Bob then select a random subset of EPR pairs,
and test to see if they violate Bell’s inequality, or some
other appropriate test of fidelity. Passing the test certi-
fies that they continue to hold sufficiently pure, entangled
quantum states. However, if tampering has occurred, Al-
ice and Bob discard these EPR pairs, and new EPR pairs
should be constructed again. Without loss of generality
we suppose that all the EPR pairs used in our scheme
are the Bell state |Φ+〉AB.
Secure direct communication using teleportation — Af-
ter insuring the security of the quantum channel (EPR
pairs), we begin secure direct communication. Suppose
that Bob has a particle sequence and he wishes to com-
municate information to Alice. First Bob makes his par-
ticle sequence in the states, composed of |+〉 and |−〉,
according to the message sequence. For example if the
message to be transmitted is 01001, then the sequence
of particle states should be in the state |+〉|−〉|+〉|+〉|−〉,
i.e. |+〉 and |−〉 correspond to 0 and 1 respectively. Re-
markably quantum entanglement of EPR pairs can serve
as a channel for transmission of messages encoded in the
sequence of particle states. This is the process so called
quantum teleportation [23] which we now describe. We
will use subscripts A and B for the systems which com-
prise |Φ+〉AB and the subscript C for Bob’s particles with
messages. The systems B and C are thus in Bob’s pos-
session and A is in Alice’s possession. In components we
write the qubit state carrying message
|Ψ〉C = 1√
2
(|0〉C + b|1〉C),
where b = 1 and b = −1 correspond to |+〉 and |−〉
respectively. The overall state of the three qubits is
|Φ+〉AB|Ψ〉C
=
1
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉AB)(|0〉C + b|1〉C)
=
1
2
√
2
{(|0〉A + b|1〉A)|Φ+〉BC + (|0〉A − b|1〉A)|Φ−〉BC
+ (b|0〉A + |1〉A)|Ψ+〉BC + (b|0〉A − |1〉A)|Ψ−〉BC)}.
Thus if Bob performs a Bell measurement on his two
particles BC then regardless of the identity of |Ψ〉C , each
outcome will occur with equal probability 1
4
. Hence after
this measurement, the resulting state of Alice’s particle
will be respectively
1√
2
(|0〉A + b|1〉A) = U00|Ψ〉A,
1√
2
(|0〉A − b|1〉A) = U01|Ψ〉A,
1√
2
(b|0〉A + |1〉A) = U10|Ψ〉A,
1√
2
(b|0〉A − |1〉A) = U11|Ψ〉A,
where Uij are
U00 = (
1 0
0 1
), U01 = (
1 0
0 −1 ),
U10 = (
0 1
1 0
), U11 = (
0 1
−1 0 ).
The two bits ij label the four possible outcomes of the
Bell measurement. Now the crucial observation is that in
each case the state of Alice’s particle is related to |Ψ〉C
by a fixed unitary transformation Uij independent of the
identity of |Ψ〉. Thus if Bob communicates to Alice the
two bits ij of classical information (i.e. his actual Bell
measurement outcome) in a public channel then Alice
will be able to apply the corresponding inverse transfor-
mation U−1ij to her particle, restoring it to state |Ψ〉A in
every case. Then Alice measures the base {|+〉, |−〉} and
read out the messages that Bob want to transmit to her.
This process of quantum teleportation has various no-
table features. Once Alice and Bob are in the possession
of their shared entanglement EPR pair, it is entirely un-
affected by any noise in the spatial environment between
them. Thus teleporattion achieves perfect transmission
of delicate information across a noisy environment as-
suming that classical information is robust and easy to
protect against noise (as it is). Also the entanglement of
3EPR pair is independent of the spatial location of Alice
relative to Bob so that Alice may travel around and Bob
can transfer the information without even knowing her
location – he needs only to broadcast the two bit informa-
tion of his Bell measurement outcome say, by publishing
it in a newspaper advertisement. In the process of tele-
portation, Alice is left with a perfect instance of |Ψ〉 and
hence no participants can gains any further information
about its identity. So in our scheme teleportation trans-
mits Bob’s message without revealing any information to
a potential eavesdropper if the quantum channel is per-
fect EPR pairs (perfect quantum channel).
The security of this protocol only depends on the per-
fect quantum channel (pure EPR pairs). Thus as long as
the quantum channel is perfect, our scheme is secure and
confidential. By means of the schemes testing the secu-
rity of quantum channel in Refs. [2, 13, 22], we can ensure
that the quantum channel is perfect. So our scheme for
direct communication using EPR pairs and teleportation
is absolutely reliable, deterministic and secure.
We should pointed out that it is necessary for testing
the security of quantum channel, since a potential eaves-
dropper may obtain information as following:
(1) Eve can use the entanglement pair to obtain infor-
mation. Suppose that Eve has a particle pair in the state
|Φ+〉DE . When Eve obtains particle B in preparing EPR
pair, she performs a Bell measurement on the particles
BD. Then the particles AE will be in one of the entan-
glement states {|Φ+〉AE , |Φ−〉AE , |Ψ+〉AE , |Ψ−〉AE}. The
entanglement states will be determined by the measure-
ment outcome according to the following equation
|Φ+〉AB|Φ+〉DE
=
1
2
(|Φ+〉BD|Φ+〉AE + |Φ−〉BD|Φ−〉AE
+ |Ψ+〉BD|Ψ+〉AE + |Ψ−〉BD〉|Ψ−〉AE).
Suppose after the measurement the state of particles BD
collapses to the state |Φ−〉BD, thus the particlesAE must
be in the state |Φ−〉AE . Then Eve will transmit the par-
ticle B to Bob. Both Alice and Bob does not know that
there is a potential eavesdropper listening to their con-
versation if they do not test the quantum channel. Bob
will proceed as usual. Therefore a part of messages might
be leaked to Eve.
However by testing quantum channel we can find Eve
and avoid the information being leaked. In fact after the
Bell measurement performed by Eve, particles AE are in
an entangled state
|Φ−〉AE = 1√
2
(|+〉A|−〉E + |−〉A|+〉E),
and particles BD are also in an entangled state
|Φ−〉BD = 1√
2
(|+〉B |−〉D + |−〉B|+〉D),
but there is not any correlation between A and B. So
when Alice and Bob perform the measurement in the
base {|+〉, |−〉} independently, the result will be random
without any correlation. If it is the case we can assert
that an eavesdropper exist and the EPR pairs should be
discarded.
(2) Eve can obtain information by coupled EPR pair
with her probe in preparing EPR pair. We can test
whether the quantum channel is perfect or not in this
case by the following strategy. We select a random sub-
set of EPR pairs. Alice and Bob perform a measure-
ment in base {|0〉, |1〉} or base {|+〉, |−〉} randomly. If the
measurement outcomes are completely correlation in the
same base of Alice and Bob, then the quantum channel
is completely perfect or secure, because EPR pair state is
the simultaneous eigenstate of the operators σAx σ
B
x and
σAz σ
B
z with the same eigenvalue 1. Here σx and σz are
Pauli operators. However if the measurement outcomes
of Alice and Bob are not correlation completely in the
same base chosen by Alice and Bob, there might be a po-
tential Eve, who have coupled EPR pair with her probe.
Here we omit the proof and give an example of this case
only. Let Alice’s particle A, Bob’s particle B and Eve’s
particle F in the following entangled state
|Φ+〉ABF = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)
=
1
2
[|+〉A(|+〉B|+〉F + |−〉B|−〉F )
+|−〉A(|+〉B|−〉F + |−〉B|+〉F )].
If Alice and Bob perform a measurement in the base
{|+〉, |−〉} whether Alice’s measurement outcome is |+〉A
or |−〉A, Bob will have the same probability 12 to obtain|+〉B and |−〉B. That is to say that Alice’s outcome is
not correlation with that of Bob’s. If this is the case,
evidently there is a potential eavesdropper. We should
abandon the quantum channel.
However, under any case, as long as eavesdropper ex-
ists, we can find her and insure the security of quantum
channel to realize secure direct communication.
In summary, we give a scheme for secure direct com-
munication. There is no need for establishing a shared
secret key in this protocol. The communication is based
on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs and teleportation be-
tween Alice and Bob. After insuring the security of the
quantum channel (EPR pairs), Bob encodes the secret
message directly on a sequence of particle states and
transmits them to Alice by teleportation. Evidently tele-
portation transmits Bob’s message without revealing any
information to a potential eavesdropper. Alice can read
out the encoded messages directly by the measurement
on her qubits. Because there is not a transmission of the
qubit which carries the secret message between Alice and
Bob, it is completely secure for direct secret communica-
tion if perfect quantum channel is used.
In the scheme of Deng et al [22], the security of quan-
tum channel and without revealing any information to
a potential eavesdropper in transferring information has
been guaranteed. However if Eve intercepts the particles
4carrying secret messages in the transmitting channel, al-
though she can not obtain any information, she can make
interruption of communication. In our scheme informa-
tion was transmitted using teleportation, the communi-
cation can not be intercepted. Therefore our new proto-
col has high capacity to defect interference.
In Ekert’s QKD protocol [2] only half of EPR pairs
are contributed to a secret key. In our scheme all perfect
EPR pairs may be used to transmit information. Ob-
viously in our protocol the entanglement resources, the
EPR pairs, are used much more efficiently.
Teleportation has been realized in the experiments
[24, 25, 26], therefore our protocol for secure direct com-
munication will be realized by experiment easily.
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